ANTH 2700: Key debates in anthropology
Social Sciences Building 410 (A02)
Week of May 09, 2022 (Week 11)
Slides available at http://anthro.rschram.org/2700/2022/11
Main reading: Bamford (2004)
According to Shah (2007), the 1901 and 1931 censuses of British India are major sources for the official sense of the category of tribe (see also Fuller 2016, 2017).
They were designed by “anthropologists,” or so they said:
Insofar as Risley and Hutton’s censuses count and sort people into categories that they designed, then their “anthropology” is purely an etic perspective.
In a revised edition of Imagined Communities, Anderson says that the census, the map, and the museum are three core tools of colonial power, and three seeds of a future national consciousness (Anderson  2006, chap. 10). But why?
If an imagined community of a nation inherits a conceptual framework from colonial knowledge, then so too does anthropology.
Anthropology today does not have any vestige of racial theories or evolutionary types. It instead frames difference in a lens of cultural relativism.
Anthropology learns from the ground up, like a child being taught by a parent. But every anthropologist will always filter what they observe through categories they already possess. Everyone does that.
As a way of understanding people, anthropology has to make a specific commitment to a theory of the world in the most basic sense, a theory of what makes things what they are: an ontology.
Metanarratives of change, for instance, can differ greatly but still have the same stock characters
The metanarratives differ in the relationships between these two types of thing, but in any of the dominant frameworks, everything is either one or the other. They have the same ontological commitments.
Anthropologists are people watching people.
There is nothing special to what anthropologists do; everyone is always doing fieldwork in their own lives.
Kamea people analyze each other, but with different categories
Secret knowledge revealed only to men makes the second question more salient, but only because it rests on ontological assumptions about biology, bodies, and selfhood.
Imagine you meet someone who says “I am a sea eagle” or “My yams respect me and I respect them.”
The weak reading of these statements is that sea eagle and a yam’s attitudes are metaphors for something else.
The strong reading is that these statements produce a specific shared reality
Marilyn Strathern on the question of personhood and social theory:
Far from being regarded as unique entities, Melanesian persons are as dividually as they are individually conceived. They contain a generalized sociality within. Indeed, persons are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the relationships that produced them. (Strathern 1988, 13)
> We do not, of course, have to imagine that these ideas exist as a set of ground rules or a kind of template for everything that Melanesians do or say.... The intention is not an ontological statement to the effect that there exists a type of social life based on premises in inverse relation to our own. Rather it is to utilize the language that belongs to our own in order to create contrast internal to it. Consequently, the strategy of an us/them divide is not meant to suggest that Melanesian societies can be presented in a timeless, monolithic way.... The intention is to make explicit the practice of anthropological description itself. (Strathern 1988, 15–16)
Kamea men are men in the context of male initiation. Masculinity is situational, and in other contexts other genders come to the fore.
In other words, take note of the strong and weak readings of ontological relativity
Seeing the different assumptions that guide people’s actions should lead us to reflect on unseen similarities, not differences.
Any written work of scholarship has one purpose: to argue for a single claim.
In any essay, everything has to contribute to supporting one main claim, whether it’s one paragraph long or a 100,000-word book.
In the second essay, you are asked to identify an anthropologist whose work you want to know better. I am asking you:
That is, you are making a claim to answer one of two possible questions:
These questions—and any essay question—have multiple possible answers. There are no right and wrong answers. Some answers have better reasons for them.
Your best reasons in support of an answer will be based on a close reading of the chosen scholar’s empirical research
Basic, concrete facts about them, their words, their statements .
An inference about their perspective, orientation, outlook, or assumptions.
An argument has, in the most basic form, three kinds of materials:
Write first, think later.
Anderson, Benedict Richard O’Gorman. (1983) 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
Bamford, Sandra. 2004. “Conceiving Relatedness: Non-Substantial Relations Among the Kamea of Papua New Guinea.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 10 (2): 287–306. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2004.00190.x.
———. 2007. Biology Unmoored: Melanesian Reflections on Life and Biotechnology. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
Fuller, C. J. 2016. “Colonial Anthropology and the Decline of the Raj: Caste, Religion and Political Change in India in the Early Twentieth Century1.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 26 (3): 463–86. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1356186315000486.
———. 2017. “Ethnographic inquiry in colonial India: Herbert Risley, William Crooke, and the study of tribes and castes.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 23 (3): 603–21. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12654.
Shah, Alpa. 2007. “The Dark Side of Indigeneity?: Indigenous People, Rights and Development in India.” History Compass 5 (6): 1806–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2007.00471.x.
Strathern, Marilyn. 1988. The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. https://dx.doi.org/10.1525/9780520910713.
Toulmin, Stephen. (1958) 2003. The Uses of Argument. Updated edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.